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G E N E R A L R E V I E W O F C O M M O D I T Y M A R K E T S 
'HE year 1950 was remarkable for the sharp rise which took place in the prices of all commo­
dities. 
When the pound sterling was devalued in September, 1949, nobody seriously thought that 
prices of raw materials would not rise in consequence. The rises during the last months of 1949 
were, however, moderate and during the first few months of 1950 there was in some directions 
even a tendency for prices to decline. Half way through the year the outbreak of war in Korea 
brought new influences into play. It became necessary for the North Atlantic Treaty countries 
to take defensive measures and the substantial increase in industrial activity which this entailed 
was certainly a reason for some adjustment in prices. In addition there was the prospect which 
had to be faced of an extension of the hostilities and a decreasing flow of raw materials from the 
East which made it prudent to build up stocks of essential commodities. 
Even so one would hardly have expected prices to skyrocket as they did. Still less would 
one have expected to see responsible buyers continually supporting this trend except where there 
was immediate great need or imminent shortage. Prices have subsequently subsided, although 
not yet to the level at which they stood just prior to the Korean war. 
Such large and abrupt fluctuations are undesirable in every respect. They are too short­
lived to be of material benefit to the producer whilst their effect on industry and the trade can be 
very serious. 
One of the foremost reasons for the rise was shortage, which if not an acute shortage was 
at all events the lack of any surplus to meet an unforeseen demand. We tend perhaps to hark 
back too much to the conditions which existed before the last war and to forget the changes which 
have taken place, the destruction of wealth which must be replaced, the vast increases in popula­
tion, and the changing face of Asia and the Far East. Primary producers in the British Common­
wealth, as can be seen from the smallness of the increases in their production during the last few 
years, appear to have taken a very sceptical view of the duration of post-war prices, which latter 
must surely have been very remunerative. A possible reason for this is because Government 
Departments, by taking too much part not only in the planning and control of production, but 
also in the actual buying and selling, have tended to obscure the facts and thereby not allowing 
the forces of price variations to play their natural part. Or again it may be that producers were 
either deterred by political unrest in their territories or, remembering the lean years of the 1930's, 
did not wish to risk capital in long-term schemes. Whatever the reasons the result has undoubtedly 
been insufficient production, most particularly in the sterling area. 
The practice of long-term buying and selling between governments is not proving successful. 
It is impossible for any body of people to foresee price movements very far ahead and the result, 
however good the intention, instead of promoting trade simply causes ill-feeling and very often 
broken contracts. 
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If it is the genuine desire, as it should be, of this country to assist production of certain essen­
tial commodities within the Commonwealth, the basis of any long-term agreement should be a 
guaranteed minimum price to the producer leaving him, free to sell at least a part of his production 
through his normal trade channels at world prices. This would encourage production in a reason­
able manner, providing in time sufficient of those raw materials which are most economically 
produced within the Commonwealth both for home consumption and for export. 
However attractive it may seem as a means of providing revenue, the imposition in times 
of scarcity of export taxes on commodities b y the governments of producing countries would 
appear to be short-sighted. I t is a source of irritation to all sections of the trade : to the producer 
who resents the idea of a tax being put on his efforts, to the consumer who invariably has to pay 
the increase and to the intermediaries who have the distasteful task of arguing the matter back­
wards and forwards. The reasoning behind export taxes, which is that the higher the price the 
more can the producer afford to pay, can quickly prove fallacious and we know of commodities 
where the tax is over one-third of the market value and the supply becoming scarcer almost daily. 
Greater production of raw materials within the Commonwealth will be the predominant 
factor in balancing our trade and practical assistance and encouragement should be given to those 
.who have the.experience and the enterprise to accomplish it. 
The effect of price controls on those countries who require the raw commodities to feed 
and clothe their populations and to supply their manufacturing industries is felt most when markets 
are on the decline. Manufacturers, who are allocated raw materials at prices which are fixed from 
time to time, very often have no means of covering themselves against a sudden fall in raw material 
values, whereas if they ask a price for a finished product, based on the price paid for the raw 
material, they are uncompetitive in the world markets. 
The facility of laying off this risk should therefore be given to the manufacturer either in the 
form, of a future market or by allowing him or his agent to sell in the world markets with a possible 
loss of foreign exchange. We are having to face increasing competition in every field of our 
industrial activities. Price counts everywhere and on fluctuating markets a manufacturer can 
only be continually competitive if he is continually buying or replacing his raw materials at the 
current price. 
A nasty taint of unscrupulous avoidance of contractual* obligations has made itself felt in 
certain directions and judging from the number of disputes which have arisen recently, a large 
section of the commercial world would, no doubt, be glad to be able to avail itself more freely 
•of the security and fair dealing which the United Kingdom produce markets, through centuries of 
successful trading, are able to offer. 
The value of these markets as a spurce of revenue does not, of course, escape the notice of 
the responsible authorities and some additional concessions are given as each year goes by. The 
proper functioning of these markets is, however, a matter of interest to a wide range of both pro­
ducing and consuming countries and particularly to producing countries within the Common­
wealth. A continual loosening up of control within this country combined with as great a measure, 
as possible of convertibility of currencies seems essential from every point of view. 
Copra 
During 1950 there were wide fluctuations in prices but the Copra market remained generally 
firm with a constant upward tendency during the second half of the year. There were small 
208 
increases in exports but these were insufficient to meet the additional demand caused by stock 
piling. Whereas rises in price were seen in Copra from both soft and hard currency countries 
of production, the European demand was mainly for Copra which could be paid for in soft currencies 
and shipments of Philippine Copra to Europe were relatively small. 
Indonesia was granted independence at the beginning of 1950. . The change over in Govern­
ment delayed shipments and the quantity originally expected did not materialise. Controls were 
maintained on Indonesian Copra and on a great deal of Copra from British territories, whilst Ceylo n 
and Seychelles Copra were released from control. 
Uni ted Kingdom.—Imports for 1950 totalled 113,818 tons, as against 106,842 tons for 
1949, and were chiefly from the South Sea Islands, augmented with some supplies from British 
East Africa and Copra bought under long-term contracts from several of the estates in Malaya. 
Ceylon Copra was no longer available under a bulk contract and the contract with Seychelles 
also expired and was not renewed. 
Ceylon.—Exports for 1950 totalled 21,117 tons. In 1949 there were 21,575 tons. Very little 
Ceylon Copra went to Europe during 1950, exports being chiefly to India and Pakistan. The 
increase in crushing capacity continues to reduce the supplies of Copra available for export. In 
March the control on Desiccated Coconut in the U.K. was lifted, which resulted in an immediate 
increased demand for Desiccated Coconut from Ceylon, which still further reduced the number 
of nuts available for Copra. Generally speaking, prices for Ceylon Copra have been somewhat 
above the parity of Straits Copra throughout the year. N o Ceylon Copra was sold to the U.K. 
as in former years, due to the contract for purchases of Copra from Ceylon not having been con­
tinued. The Government of Ceylon encourages the export of Coconut Oil and the alterations of 
export duties early in 1951 left the export duty on Copra double the parity of the export duty on 
Coconut Oil. 
Coconut Oi l 
During the year the last vestiges of control on export of Coconut Oil from Ceylon were 
removed. On 30th June the somewhat nominal control exercised by the Ceylon Government 
by means of Export Licences based on minimum prices was discontinued so that thenceforward 
export of Coconut Oil from the main sterling producing areas, Ceylon and Malaya, became abso­
lutely free. The U.K. received practically no oil from these centres—the records show that only 
199 tons were shipped from Ceylon and none from Malaya. 
Shipments from Ceylon were lower, being 75,717 tons against 89,184 in 1949 and from Malaya 
57,032 tons against 61,226 tons in 1949. Shipments from the Philippine Islands were higher 
at 69,892 tons against 64,147 tons in 1949. 
Shipments of Coconut Oil into the U.K. were considerably reduced, being only 17,396 tons 
of which 9,873 tons were from Fiji and 7,511 from other Commonwealth countries, but as men­
tioned there were no exports from Malaya to the U.K. during 1950. 
Malayan prices showed no great variation during the first six months of the year and in Ceylon 
prices during the early months were maintained at a rather artificial level, but during the last six 
months of the year all prices rose fairly substantially in common with other produce on the impetus 
given by the outbreak of war in Korea. 
Ceylon.—As mentioned above the Ceylon' Government removed all price controls 
on the 30th June. Previously to this the Government fixed from time to time minimum export 
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prices below which Export Licences were not to be granted and as a consequence of this, trade with 
Ceylon was somewhat irregular and difficult during the first half of the year. Pakistan appeared 
to be the best buyer, continuing to be a good regular buyer at the limit prices. However, as 
Pakistan buys only Oil in packages the main Ceylon export trade, which is the bulk business, 
was very quiet, although in May Canada was reported to have bought almost 5,000 tons of Oil 
in bulk at the parity of £136 per ton c.i.f. The price of Ceylon Coconut Oil was maintained at 
artificially high limits during the first few months of the year—in January the official price' was 
about £154 per ton, in February/March about £160 and thereafter it dropped fairly sharply and it 
was clear that trade was being licensed at under the minimum prices. 
Efforts were being made to persuade the Government to reduce, the published minimum prices, 
but while good prices were still being obtained from Pakistan, the Government saw no reason to 
do so. As time went on, however, it seemed clear that the price limit was in fact decided by the 
figure at which the Millers would sell and by the end of June Oil in bulk was down to about £1x1 
per ton c. i. f., which was cheaper than Straits Coconut Oil at the time. 
The decision of the Ceylon Government, taken at the end of June, to allow the market t o 
find its own level in the future was, no doubt, a wise one. At the same time the Ceylon Govern­
ment put an extra duty of 15 o rupees per ton on export of Copra in order to protect the Millers 
by discouraging export of Copra and encouraging, export of Oil. 
With the commencement of the war in Korea in July, prices started to rise slowly and in 
August there was a sharp rise caused by general buying especially from Germany. By September 
a price of £15 7 per ton had been reached. There was a slight recession at the beginning of October 
to £136 per ton, but a firmer tone very soon reasserted itself and prices continued to rise gradually 
through the last few months of the year and closed at about £15 5 per ton c.i.f. 
I t is thought that the tendency will be for the exportable surplus of Oil from Ceylon to be 
reduced owing to the continual increase in domestic consumption. As will be seen from the 
statistics, the average exports are 75,000-85,000 tons per annum and the annual production is 
reckoned to be about 120,000 tons per annum. The consumption in Colombo alone is reported 
to be about 50 tons per day, say about 18,000 tons per annum, and this is continually growing. 
The analyses of the Ceylon export figures are rather interesting. They show that out of the 
total export of 75/717 tons India took 4,249 tons, Pakistan 11,298 tons, Italy 10,396 tons, Germany 
9,3 51 tons and Holland 18,601 tons. A great part of the latter total, no doubt, includes Oil shipped 
to Holland in transit for Germany. 
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